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Abstract 
 
Environmental factors are likely to affect human mobility in the form of migration, but the 
empirical evidence remains to be inconclusive. This research seeks to contribute shedding more 
light on this ambiguity: we examine whether and how environmental change leads to internal 
(i.e., domestic) migration at the individual level. It is argued that individual perceptions of 
different types of environmental change (sudden vs. gradual events) determine migration 
decisions in diverse ways. Empirically, the corresponding arguments are analyzed with new 
survey data, which have been collected in five developing countries and include both individuals 
who migrated and those who decided to stay. The results suggest that individual perceptions of 
long-term (gradual) environmental events, such as droughts, lower the likelihood of internal 
migration. However, there is some evidence that sudden-onset events, such as floods, increase 
the chances to move. These findings substantially improve our understanding of which type of 
environmental factors make individuals leave their homes, and they suggest that a more 
differentiated perspective on the issue of environmental migration based on adaptation is needed. 
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Introduction 
The debate on the consequences of climate change increasingly focuses on the relationship 
between environmental change and human migration. While the empirical evidence for the link 
between climate-related and environmental events and migration remains inconclusive (Black et 
al. 2011a: 435), it is in fact the case that policymakers, public institutions, and scholars often 
argue that climate change is expected to lead to migration due to extreme sudden weather events, 
such as stronger and more recurrent storms or floods, as well as long-term, gradual problems, 
such as droughts and rising sea levels (see also Foresight Migration Project 2011; Jäger et al. 
2009; Laczko and Aghazarm 2009). For instance, according to the recent Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014: 16) report, “[c]limate change is projected to increase 
displacement of people (medium evidence, high agreement).1 However – for the most part – 
estimates predicting environmental migration2 to occur at a larger scale in the future have been 
widely criticized. This critique primarily stems from the overestimation of the number of 
environmental migrants due to two reasons. First, figures are usually based on the people 
exposed to increasing environmental risks, and not on the people actually expected to migrate. 
Second, these studies do not account for different levels of vulnerability to environmental change 
and potential adaptation strategies (Adger et al. 2015; Hunter et al. 2015; McLeman 2014; 
Gemenne 2011; Black et al. 2011a,b; Kniveton et al. 2008). 
Still, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that weather variability may lead to migration 
flows. For example, in the 1930s, an estimated two-and-a-half million North Americans are said 
to have left the Great Plains because of droughts and dust storms (Reuveny 2007; see also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Moreover, “displacement risk increases when populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience 
higher exposure to extreme weather events, such as floods and droughts…Changes in migration patterns can be 
responses to both extreme weather events and longer term climate variability and change, and migration can also be 
an effective adaptation strategy” (IPCC 2014: 73). 
2 We use the term “environmental migration” when referring to persons who are displaced primarily for 
environmental reasons (see Dun and Gemenne (2008) for a thorough discussion of the definition of “environmental 
migration”). 
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McLeman 2006, 2014); and in 2005, Hurricane Katrina resulted in one-and-a-half million people 
being displaced temporarily and about 500,000 permanently (McLeman 2014; Fussell et al. 
2010). Unfortunately, such case-specific evidence does not allow for general conclusions with 
respect to whether and how environmental change actually affects migration. In addition, the 
environment-migration relationship may well be conditional on various individual, socio-
economic and political factors, which require a more generalizable empirical analysis than case-
specific studies can provide (e.g., Adger et al. 2015; Hunter et al. 2015; McLeman 2014; Black 
et al. 2011a,b). 
That said, there exists a large body of literature studying the impacts of the environment on 
internal and international migration using macro- (e.g., Beine and Parsons 2015; Robalino et al. 
2015; Marchiori et al. 2012; Black et al. 2011a; Feng et al. 2010; Saldaña-Zorrilla and Sandberg 
2009; Reuveny and Moore 2009; Myers et al. 2008) or micro-level (e.g., Kelly et al. 2015; 
Bohra-Mishra et al. 2014; Mueller et al. 2014; Penning-Rowsell et al. 2013; Gray and Mueller 
2012a,b; Dillon et al. 2011; Doevenspeck 2011; Massey et al. 2010; Gray 2011, 2009; Mortreux 
and Barnett 2009; Halliday 2006; Paul 2005; Henry et al. 2004) data and a diverse range of 
approaches, including quantitative methods, qualitative research, or both methods.3 While these 
works offer intriguing insights into the complex relationship between environmental change and 
migration, their findings remain, as indicated above, inconclusive (Adger et al. 2015; Hunter et 
al. 2015; IPCC 2014; Obokata et al. 2014; Gray and Bilsborrow 2013; Black et al. 2011a,b; 
Raleigh et al. 2008). This empirical ambiguity may, on one hand, stem from the lack of 
theoretical work and data, which induces that our knowledge on which individuals decide to 
migrate and which decide to stay – and why – remains limited. On the other hand, most studies 
focus only on one aspect of environmental change, such as flood, rainfall/temperature changes, 
or drought,	   and do not simultaneously examine the effects of different types of environmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For a more comprehensive and detailed review of the existing literature, see Adger et al. (2015), Hunter et al. 
(2015), McLeman (2014), Piguet (2010), or the Foresight Project (2011). 
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change on migration in order to infer their unbiased individual effect on migration likelihood. In 
addition, previous research has not sufficiently addressed why environmental change causes 
migration in some regions or countries, but not in others (see also Adger et al. 2015; Hunter et al. 
2015, McLeman 2014, and Black et al. 2011a,b). 
In order to address these issues, our first contribution to the literature comes from developing 
a theoretical argument that links individual perceptions of different types of environmental 
change to individuals’ decisions to migrate or stay.4 To this end, and as elaborated thoroughly in 
the theoretical section below, we choose the term perceptions to express that we capture not only 
individuals’ exposure to environmental change and, eventually, their willingness to migrate, but 
also their capability and opportunity to actually do so (see also Most and Starr 1989). Second, we 
focus on two types of environmental change that may affect migration: sudden and short-term 
vs. slow-onset and long-term environmental events. As Black et al. (2011a: 437) emphasize such 
a distinction “is useful in terms of both aiding understanding [environmental migration], as well 
as identifying key policy implications.”  
Empirically, the corresponding arguments are analyzed with newly collected survey data, 
which comprise both individuals who migrated and individuals who decided to stay in five 
countries: Vietnam, Cambodia, Uganda, Nicaragua, and Peru. As indicated, a key strength of 
these new data is that we integrate individual environmental perceptions with other migration-
relevant determinants at the individual and household levels to provide a more complete picture 
of the decision to migrate or stay (Adger et al. 2015; Hunter et al. 2015; Black et al. 2011a; 
Bardsley and Hugo 2010; Hunter 2005; Stark and Bloom 1985). The focus on environmental 
perceptions fills an empirical gap that was recently identified by Hunter et al. (2015: 13). We 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 We study voluntary migration, which occurs when environmental events lead to temporary disruption of 
livelihoods or to deterioration of environmental conditions, as opposed to forced migration, which occurs when 
environmental events threaten the physical safety of populations or lead to unfeasible livelihoods (see Renaud et al. 
2010). Moreover, we focus on internal migration as there is strong consensus in the literature that most migration 
flows associated with environmental factors are of an internal nature (Hunter et al. 2015: 3; Foresight Project 2011; 
Adamo and Izazola 2010; Raleigh et al. 2008). 
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find that the effects of individual perceptions of and attitudes toward environmental change 
strongly depend on the nature of the environmental event: while long-term, gradual 
environmental events, such as drought or salinity, lower the likelihood of migration, sudden-
onset environmental events, such as storms or floods, usually tend to increase it. 
 
What Determines Individuals’ Environmental Migration? 
While earlier studies on environmental migration draw on neo-Malthusian arguments, which 
claim that there is a direct and unidirectional impact of environmental change, recent research is 
based on a more complex pattern of causality in which environmental, economic, political, 
social, and demographic factors are interrelated. Understanding these interrelationships 
facilitates disentangling the role that environmental factors play in population movements 
(Adger et al. 2015; Hunter et al. 2015; McLeman 2014; Black et al 2011a,b; Piguet et al. 2011).  
However, thus far, we lack a coherent theory of migration, and face instead a fragmented set 
of approaches that are often segmented by disciplinary academic boundaries (Black et al. 
2011a,b; see also Adger et al. 2015). For instance, neoclassical economists emphasize that 
potential migrants calculate their expected earnings in their place of origin in comparison to 
various destinations (Lilleor and Van den Broeck 2011; Harris and Todaro 1970; Todaro 1969). 
Or it is contended that migration decisions are taken by the household as a whole as part of its 
survival strategy, since migration of a household member is seen as a way for the household to 
minimize risks and maximize its chances of survival under conditions of economic uncertainty 
by diversifying its sources of income (Stark and Lucas 1988; Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark and 
Levhari 1982). Sociologists highlight migrant networks and a “culture of migration” (Kandel and 
Massey 2002; Massey 1990a), while political scientists primarily stress political instability and 
violence as driving migration (Raleigh 2011; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).  
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To the extent that environmental factors are considered in these studies, they are regarded as 
either “stressors” or “locational characteristics” that influence the likelihood of migration (Adger 
et al. 2015; Hunter et al. 2015; Lilleør and Van den Broeck 2011; Knapp and Graves 1989; 
Speare 1974; Wolpert 1966). According to the “stress-threshold” model (Wolpert 1966; see also 
Bardsley and Hugo 2010), environmental events, such as floods or droughts, can act as 
“stressors” that affect individuals’ life satisfaction. Not surprisingly, a growing number of 
studies demonstrates that disruptions in climatic and environmental factors are associated with 
non-negligible changes in happiness and life satisfaction (e.g., Maddison and Rehdanz 2011; 
Luechinger and Raschky 2009; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy 2007). Environmental stress 
should then be more important in areas prone to natural disasters and/or where people are 
directly dependent on the natural environment for their livelihood, e.g., when individuals depend 
on rain-fed agriculture. 
When subscribing to the claim that environmental stressors affect personal income and the 
opportunity for future employment negatively,5 thereby reducing life satisfaction, we argue that 
the individual might consider migration to places with better environmental attributes as a 
response. However, we submit that migration is not a “default” response to environmental 
change. Migration is costly, in both financial and sociological/psychological terms, since 
individuals tend to develop strong personal bonds with their home location over the course of 
their life (Adams and Adger 2013; Penning-Rowsell et al. 2013; Devine-Wright 2013; Lewicka 
2011; Mortreux and Barnett 2009). Consequently, an individual will consider migration only 
when (1) environmental change has a major impact on her personal well-being, while (2) the 
individual’s efforts to adapt to and/or mitigate this impact have failed or are likely to fail in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Beegle et al. (2011), using micro-data from Tanzania, report that rainfall shocks increase the probability that 
people leave their villages. Similarly, Barrios et al. (2010) find that rainfall shortages raise rural out-migration in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Lilleør and Van den Broeck (2011), on the other hand, provide a critical review of the existing 
theoretical and empirical research on how climate change and climate variability in less developed countries (LDCs) 
could affect migration via their effect on personal income.  
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future (see also Penning-Rowsell et al. 2013; Bardsley and Hugo 2010; Speare 1974). If the 
environment has a major impact and adaptation is unlikely to succeed,6 the costs of migration are 
lower than the costs of staying at a given place and, hence, migration becomes an adaptation 
strategy to environmental change (Adger et al. 2015, 2009; Black et al 2011c; Bardsley and 
Hugo 2010).  
In line with other studies (e.g., Hunter et al. 2015; Black et al. 2011a), we emphasize that 
migration decisions are likely to be affected to a large degree by individual perceptions of 
environmental change, rather than environmental change identified objectively with “scientific 
risk analysis, performed by experts, of system characteristics of the physical or social world” 
(e.g., Dessai et al. 2004: 11). Environmental perception is the means by which individuals seek 
to understand their environment in order to arrive at a more effective response to environmental 
hazards. Environmental perception encompasses both direct experience of the environment and 
indirect information from other people, science, and the mass media, which are in turn mediated 
by individual values, roles, and attitudes. In this sense, perceptions of (environmental) risk can 
act as a “mediating factor” between environmental change and migration (Bardsley and Hugo 
2010; Hunter 2005; Dessai et al. 2004). And it is likely that perceptions of environmental change 
along with individual characteristics related to their (perceived) adaptive ability – and 
institutional opportunities and constraints – may be better able to explain why some people leave 
their homes when facing environmental threats, while others do not (Black et al. 2013, 2011a; 
Mortreux and Barnett 2009).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Burke and Emerick (forthcoming) and Dell et al. (2014) provide evidence for limited adaptation among farmers. 
Unfortunately, our survey data lack a temporal dimension and we thus cannot say much about the effectiveness of 
the adaptation strategies our survey respondents implemented. We can report, however, that almost all respondents 
implemented at least one adaptation measure after they had experienced the environmental event mentioned in their 
questionnaire. In addition, existing literature does, in fact, provide evidence that perceptions of climatic changes 
such as changes in temperature are associated with a higher probability to implement some type of adaptation 
strategy: for example, Di Falco and Veronesi (2013) for Ethiopia; Bellow et al. (2012) for Tanzania; Bryan et al. 
(2013) for Kenya; Chinvanno et al. (2008) for Vietnam; Seo and Mendelsohn (2008) for Africa; Seo et al. (2010) for 
South America; or Gourdji et al. (2015) for Nicaragua. There is also some evidence that the implementation of 
adaptation strategies might be a successful risk management strategy (see, e.g., Di Falco and Veronesi 2013) 
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Environmental change tends to have an asymmetric impact across the affected population, 
implying that while some individuals might be negatively affected by an environmental event – 
or at least perceive it that way – others could have a different perception of this. Research 
making use of individual-level data on a sample of African farmers, for example, shows that 
higher annual temperatures are associated with positive net revenues for livestock owners, but 
negative net revenues for crop producers (CEEPA 2008). Furthermore, perceptions of 
environmental change are almost by definition relative, influenced by the ability of an individual 
to cope with and adapt to environmental change, i.e., willingness and opportunity aspects (see 
Most and Starr 1989). The range of adaptive options varies among individuals depending on 
attributes of the individual or their household, e.g., work skills, age, gender, education, or 
wealth. Piguet et al. (2011) and Black et al. (2011a), among others, argue that individuals who 
have access to resources are more likely to be able to adapt to the challenges of climatic change. 
Consequently, perceptions of environmental change are shaped not only by a respective 
individual’s actual exposure to it, but also by her adaptive capacity, i.e., the possibilities and 
opportunities to cope with it (see also Grothmann and Patt 2005). 
Next to placing individual-level perceptions of environmental change at the center of our 
theory and the empirical analysis, we further argue that the specific characteristics of 
environmental change affect the decision to migrate or stay. In terms of these characteristics, we 
focus on the distinction between sudden (short-term) and slow-onset, gradual (long-term) 
environmental issues (see also McLeman 2014; Black et al. 2013, 2011a,b; Renaud et al. 2011). 
Sudden and rapid (short-term) environmental events, such as floods, storms, and hurricanes, can 
have severe impacts – at least in the short-run – on the well-being of individuals. These events 
cause casualties or injuries, property damage (e.g., houses, machinery, crops, etc.), or social and 
economic disruption. Such events are likely to produce the greatest behavioral response, because 
they are above the perceptual threshold of direct human experience and are easily recognizable 
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as extreme events with the potential to inflict a lot of (human and property) cost on individuals. 
Affected individuals may, thus, migrate in the aftermath of such environmental events, as the 
costs of migration are lower than the costs of staying at this location. The empirical implication 
of this is summarized in the following hypothesis:7 
 
Hypothesis 1:   Perceptions of sudden (short-term) environmental events positively affect 
individuals’ decisions to migrate.  
 
In contrast, slow-onset and long-term environmental events, e.g., droughts, desertification, or 
water/land salinity, even in the presence of short-term seasonal and/or annual variability, are not 
usually regarded as extreme enough to be significant, because they are likely to have a smaller 
(immediate) impact on individuals. Consequently, people will try to adjust their productive 
strategies over time when experiencing such environmental events. Individuals’ responses 
include, for instance, investments in irrigation systems, the use of drought or water resistant 
plant and animal varieties, or the diversification of income sources. Subscribing to the 
(anticipated) effectiveness of these strategies, this is likely to weaken the relationship between 
environmental change and migration. In addition, strong ties to the current location are likely to 
offset potential immediate motivations to migrate and the personal characteristics of the 
individual are a major determinant as well. Hence, we expect:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Perceptions of  slow-onset, long-term (gradual) environmental events are unlikely 
to positively affect individuals’ decisions to migrate.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Migration in the presence of short and sudden environmental events tends to be over a relatively short distance, 
temporary, and internal (Hunter et al. 2015; Gray and Mueller 2012a,b; Black et al. 2011a,b; Myers et al. 2008; 
Raleigh et al. 2008). Due to the lack of a temporal dimension in our survey, we are unable to determine whether 
migration is temporary or permanent, though. That said, our sampling procedure of migrants ensures, to some 
extent, that migration is a more permanent phenomenon in our data. See the discussion on the sampling procedure 
below. 
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Finally, derived from the previous discussion and in light of the literature highlighting the 
importance of other levels of analysis (e.g., Adger et al. 2015; Hunter et al. 2015; McLeman 
2014; Black et al. 2011b), the effect of environmental change on migration is likely to vary with 
country-level influences such as economic development as well as the political capacity of the 
government to effectively address environmental problems (Adger et al. 2009). Although 
individuals may be willing to respond to environmental changes by, e.g., developing adaptation 
strategies, their ability to do so critically depends on the availability of the technological and 
economic resources for developing innovations. Consequently, to the extent that a state’s 
economic development conditions individuals’ migration decisions, we expect richer countries to 
be more likely to deal with and adapt to environmental problems, which in turn is associated 
with less environmental migration.  
Adaptation and coping strategies are also a function of the political environment, which 
assists in promoting responses to environmental change. Relative to autocracies, democratic 
countries should experience less environmental migration as democratic leaders have the 
incentive to provide economic support, infrastructure, and social services to their citizenry for 
alleviating environmental hardship as a means to survive in office (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003). Thus, while individuals in different countries may be exposed to similar environmental 
stressors, the institutional and economic context in which stress occurs may not only mitigate the 
hazard, but also influence individuals’ perceptions of environmental risk. Eventually, we seek to 
examine a last hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Economic development and a democratic form of government are likely to 
negatively affect individuals’ decisions to migrate.  
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Research Design  
Survey Overview 
For a systematic analysis of whether environmental stressors influence migrants’ decision to 
move, we require data for both migrants and non-migrants who originally come from the same 
area. Only when comparing individuals who have stayed in the area with those who have left, we 
can isolate the effect of environmental stressors on the decision to migrate, since comparing 
individuals from the same region ensures that the context for all migrants is similar. Therefore, 
this research relies on original survey data specifically collected for this purpose that allow for a 
quantitative analysis of individual-level migration decisions.8  
To this end, we conducted an individual-level survey in five countries: Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Uganda, Nicaragua, and Peru over 2013-2014. Our surveys yielded 3,689 completed 
questionnaires in total of which about 50% (N=1,854) stem from migrants. The five case study 
countries were chosen according to the following criteria: (1) countries have been regularly 
affected by weather-related events (storms, floods, droughts, etc.) and are also vulnerable to 
future climatic change (Kreft and Eckstein 2014; ND-GAIN 2013; EM-DAT/OFDA/CRED 
2013; World Bank 2013); (2) countries come from different regions of the world (Southeast 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and Latin America); and finally, (3) since our theory 
postulates different individual reactions to slow-onset/long-term vs. sudden-onset/short-term 
environmental events, countries contain different regions experiencing these types of stressors in 
order to disentangle the effects of the two types of environmental events. Based on these criteria, 
we believe that our five sample countries provide an ideal testing ground for our theory.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The Environmental Change and Forced Migration (EACH-FOR) project is the only other data on the environment-
migration nexus with surveys carried out in 23 countries in six regions worldwide (Laczko and Aghazarm 2009: 
204; see also Warner 2011). Unlike our data, however, the EACH-FOR data focus on migrants only for most 
countries and comprise a relatively low number of cases (individuals) per state. 
9 While we sought to cover different regions of the world that may be particularly vulnerable to climate change, the 
selected countries are not representative of a particular region or continent. 
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Based on information obtained from the EM-DAT/OFDA/CRED International Disaster 
Database and archive research, we first identified relevant regions/provinces in each survey 
country that are mainly characterized by one particular environmental stressor (classified either 
as slow-onset/long-term or sudden-onset/short-term environmental event).10 We then randomly 
chose the departments/districts for the location of the survey. Table A1 in the appendix provides 
the locations of the surveys. Finally, we randomly selected communes or villages in these 
departments or districts by using a grid system with random starting points in which the 
interviews of the non-migrants took place. 
In contrast, a random sampling of migrants is hardly possible, since (by definition) they do 
not live in the same commune as the non-migrants any longer. Furthermore, in the locations they 
have migrated to, we do not know ex-ante whether a specific person has migrated from the 
relevant areas. Hence, we relied on a “chain-referral” process (see also Laczko and Aghazarm 
2009) to identify individuals who came from the exact same locations as the non-migrants, but 
who now live in the nearest major city, usually the provincial/regional capital and/or the national 
capital. Furthermore, potential migrant interviewees had to fulfill the following criteria: they (1) 
should have migrated out of the environmentally affected areas at age 18 or above; (2) were not 
seasonal migrants; (3) considered themselves as residents of this new location; and (4) their 
economic situation/livelihood was derived from this new location. Starting points of the chain-
referral were obtained by asking the non-migrant interviewees as well as the identified migrants 
in the cities whether they knew of any individuals who had left their commune or district after 
experiencing the same environmental event(s), but did not belong to the same household. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Note that there is no variation on the presence of environmental stressors, i.e., everyone experiences 
environmental stress. However, since we are not interested in objectively present environmental stress, but rather 
perceptions of and attitudes toward environmental stress, our research design is appropriate. In essence, only with 
an environmental stressor present, people can perceive it as a reason for migration (or not). We return to this issue in 
the robustness section. 
13 
 
total, we sought to obtain the same number of migrants to match the non-migrants in each 
district. 
All interviews were personal interviews consisting of both closed and open-ended questions 
that lasted for about 30 minutes. We asked all individuals about their experience with the latest 
environmental event as well as certain personal information, such as age, profession, or 
education, as well as household specific questions. The relevant parts of the questionnaire are 
listed in the appendix. 
 
Operationalization of Dependent Variable and Explanatory Items 
Migration, our dependent variable, receives the value 1 for those individuals who decided to 
migrate and 0 for those who decided to stay.11 The distribution of this variable for each 
individual country is summarized in the appendix: 1,835 individuals in our sample are non-
migrants, while 1,854 migrants are included. Hence, our sample is basically balanced for the 
dependent variable. When designing and implementing the survey, and particularly the question 
pertaining to migration, we anticipated that it would difficult to ask individuals about events in 
their past, as it is the case with any other similar project. Furthermore, the longer the time 
horizon into the past for which the respondents should provide answers, the more likely the 
problem of recall bias.	  Recall bias is unlikely to be a major issue, however, at least due to three 
reasons. First, the mentioned event(s) should have such a great scope and thus importance that 
they should easily come to mind. Second, individuals in this first step had only to recall whether 
an event occurred and not when exactly the particular event occurred. Finally, respondents could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Recent literature suggests that a better understanding of environmental migration requires distinguishing between 
three possible outcomes of environmental events: migration, displacement, and immobility (see Black et al. 2013; 
Black and Collyer 2014). This distinction clearly matters and we incorporate immobility in the dependent variable 
(Migration=0). Due to the lack of data, however, we leave a thorough examination of the displacement outcome to 
future research, but we also believe that we consider this at least partly since democracy and economic development 
should condition displacement as well. See also footnote 4 above on this. 
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name any event that occurred in the last five years which includes, of course, the recent past, 
which is most important to us and most likely should be remembered best. 
Our two main independent variables on perception of environmental change pertain to 
sudden/short-term and slow-onset/long-term events, respectively. For capturing this, we asked 
respondents – both migrants and non-migrants – to describe the main weather events they 
experienced over the past five years. Respondents could choose between several weather events 
such as heavy rain, storms and floods, or drought and salinity, but could also list any other 
weather event that was not listed in the questionnaire, or were able to state that no weather 
events have occurred in the recent past. If individuals mentioned that they experienced any 
heavy rain, storm, flood, hail/snow, hurricane, cyclone, typhoon, and/or landslide/mudslide, we 
coded this event as sudden and short-term environmental change. In contrast, we coded salinity, 
drought, or desertification as slow-onset and gradual long-term environmental problems. 
We also consider several control variables, taken from our survey, that are included in other 
studies of individual-level migration decisions. First, there are respondents’ gender and age, 
since women as well as older individuals are typically less likely to migrate (Hunter et al. 2015: 
7f). Particularly controlling for gender addresses an empirical gap Hunter et al. (2015: 13) 
identify. Following recent explanatory models of migration networks emphasizing that migration 
decisions are made in a broader socio-economic context, we also incorporate a binary variable 
on whether another household member has previously migrated. Such networks increase the 
likelihood that relatives and friends will follow once the first migrant has settled in her/his 
destination by sharply reducing the costs and risks associated with migration (Massey 1990b; see 
also Hunter et al. 2015).  
To control for potential economic reasons of migration, we rely on four different proxy 
variables, which we introduce into our models separately due to collinearity issues. First, we 
consider a respondent’s level of education. Given that education can determine employment 
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opportunities, it is often assumed that people with a low level of education tend to be more 
reliant on environment-dependent activities, such as agriculture, and are then more vulnerable to 
environmental changes; consequently, they should exhibit a higher propensity for migration 
(Van der Land and Hummel 2013). On the other hand, due to our sampling strategy, which 
mostly captures rural to urban migration, we might observe the opposite effect. Since urban areas 
are a more attractive destination for individuals with higher levels of education, these individuals 
could be more likely to migrate. We measure education via three dummy variables: whether a 
respondent has no formal education, whether a respondent received at maximum primary 
education, or whether a respondent received at maximum secondary education. Individuals with 
higher education levels serve as the baseline category. 
Second, there is the interviewers’ classification of the respondents’ economic household 
status. While the ability to move is strongly related with wealth to the extent that under adverse 
environmental conditions wealthy people are generally more able to move (Black et al. 2013), 
the “conventional narrative” often advanced in public and policy debates posits that the poor and 
vulnerable are most likely to migrate in the face of environmental problems (Gray and Mueller 
2012b), often leaving vulnerable women and children behind (Penning-Rowsell et al. 2013: s44). 
In light of this, interviewers classified whether a household is economically below average, at 
average, or above average. We constructed two dummy variables – below and above average – 
based on this information, while those individuals with an average economic status serve as the 
baseline category.12  
Third, we use the respondents’ self-assessment as to whether economic issues influenced their 
decision to migrate or not. In particular, all migrants were asked about their reasons to migrate 
and they could choose between, e.g., social, political, environmental, or economic ones. For all 
respondents who stated that economic reasons contributed to their decision to migrate, we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In terms of education and poverty, the results are virtually identical when using the original ordinal variable 
instead of the binary items and when both original ordinal variables are included in the same model. 
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assigned the value of 1 to the variable Economic Reason (0 otherwise). Since we could not ask 
the non-migrants the same question, we asked them whether they have ever thought about 
migrating from their location and, if so, which were the reasons for doing so. For those 
respondents who stated that they thought about migrating due to economic reasons, the 
Economic Reason also receives a value of 1 (0 otherwise). However, this self-assessment might 
be problematic, since individuals might want to over- or underestimate certain factors due to 
personal reasons (e.g., non-migrants might not want to admit that they do not do well 
economically). 
The final variable to control for the opportunity costs of migration captures a respondent’s 
profession as a proxy for economic well-being. The expectation here is that individuals, whose 
livelihood directly depends on the natural environment such as farmers, are more likely to move 
in the presence of adverse environmental conditions. We include the following five professions 
in our models, while individuals working in the agriculture sector are the baseline category: civil 
servants, individuals living from business sales, workers (industry, handicrafts, etc.), individuals 
with elementary professions such as day labor, and individuals living from remittances or other 
sources of income.13 
 
Empirical Findings 
How do perceptions of and attitudes toward short-term and long-term environmental events 
affect individuals’ decision to migrate? We analyze the pooled data of our five countries and rely 
on a multi-level regression framework that further allows us to control for influences beyond the 
individual level. This approach is likely to provide us with an overall assessment as to whether 
and how environmental events, on average, indeed increase migration.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The appendix reports the corresponding descriptive statistics. 
17 
 
We use a random-intercept approach that accounts for the hierarchical sampling procedure 
within countries. As described above, we deliberately chose specific regions in each of the 
countries and then relied on random sampling below this level. Hence, we must control for the 
fact that certain sub-state (regional) or country-specific factors might affect our results. For 
example, Hunter et al. (2015: 5) point to influences stemming from “a region’s historical-
political context.” To this end, we incorporate a country-level as well as a regional-level 
intercept in each of the models in Table 1, which accounts for the specific hierarchical, two-level 
nature of the pooled data set (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2009).14 Both intercepts are modeled 
according to a normal distribution (Gelman and Hill 2007).15 
__________ 
Table 1 
__________ 
The findings suggest that long-term, gradual environmental events, such as droughts or 
salinity, do not lead to migration; in fact, they even decrease the likelihood of it significantly. 
This finding is consistent with our theoretical argument that people are unlikely to migrate in 
response to longer-term environmental stressors, since they are tied to their location and, hence, 
adaptation might be the preferred option. It is worth noting, that almost all of the survey 
respondents implemented at least one adaptation measure after having experienced a long-term 
environmental event. Adaptation strategies more often mentioned include: substitute crop/switch 
animal type, change variety of crop, change sowing/planting dates, irrigate the land, sell assets, 
utilize moneylenders, and supply labor. In contrast, short-term, sudden-onset environmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Our results are robust across different specifications of the structure of the covariance matrix for the random 
effects, including when allowing all variances and covariances to be distinct. The findings also remain unchanged 
when employing a linear probability model (LPM) with regional fixed effects. We thank an anonymous reviewer for 
this suggestion. 
15 One could further argue that migratory decisions are correlated within villages. To control for this possibility we 
run models with bootstrapped standard errors clustered on villages. The main results of our analysis stay the same. 
Results are available upon request. 
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events, such as storms or floods raise the likelihood of migration. While we consistently obtain a 
positive coefficient estimate for sudden environmental events, note that it only reaches 
conventional levels of statistical significance in two out of the four models of Table 1. That is, 
when relying on the more subjective measures of economic motives of migration – interviewers’ 
assessment of household type and individual self-assessment of economic reasons to migrate – 
the coefficient is not significant. A possible explanation for this result might be the high costs 
and uncertainties associated with moving, even temporarily.  
As the coefficients in the hierarchical models for binary variables we employ cannot be 
interpreted directly, we also calculated predicted probabilities for Migration=1 and first 
differences for Sudden Events and Graduals Events, i.e., the change in the probability of 
migration when raising either environmental threat variable from 0 to 1 while holding all other 
variables constant at their observed values. Figures 1 and 2 display these substantive effects. As 
Figure 1 shows, the probability of migration is about 60% in the presence of sudden events, 
while only about 48% when individuals perceived the onset of a gradual environmental. Figure 2 
presents the substantive impact in a more intuitive way: the first differences show that changing 
Gradual Events from 0 to 1 decreases the likelihood of migration by up to 10 percentage points. 
For Sudden Events, the first differences are mixed across the models in Table 1, which mirrors 
the insignificance in half of the models in that table. 
__________ 
Figures 1 and 2 
__________ 
The control variables are mostly in line with earlier studies (see, e.g., Hunter et al. 2015) and 
our expectations. While older individuals are less likely to migrate, respondents of which a 
household member has already migrated are more likely to move to a new location as well. This 
latter finding and its corresponding variable not only control for a household effect (Massey 
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1990a,b; see also Hunter et al. 2015), but also suggest that migration is a more permanent 
phenomenon in our sample. That is, given that migration by a household member is clearly 
associated with some costs, the decision of another household member to follow is likely to be 
undertaken only when the decision to migrate is permanent. In addition, the effect of gender 
highlights that women are actually more likely to migrate (see also Gray and Mueller 2012a). It 
thus seems that gender plays a complex role in the process of environmental migration (Hunter 
et al. 2015), but may be easily explained in our sample that focuses on rural-to-urban migration: 
job opportunities for women are more likely to exist in urban areas, which then lowers the costs 
of the initial migration decision.16  
With regard to the economic reasons for migration, Model 1 suggests that individuals with 
lower levels of education than our baseline category (higher education) are less likely to migrate. 
This matches the interpretation that those individuals who most likely have better job 
opportunities due to their advanced education are more likely to look for these opportunities in a 
location other than their original place (see also Docquier et al. 2007; Beine et al. 2008). Given 
our sampling strategy, which mostly captures rural-to-urban migration, this finding might be 
more pronounced than in studies examining urban-to-urban or rural-to-rural migration. Similarly, 
Model 2 shows that individuals who are assessed to live in a wealthy household are more likely 
to migrate than individuals who come from an average-level household (baseline category), and 
individuals who are assessed to live in a poor household are less likely to move. The latter 
finding supports Black and Collyer’s (2014) argument about “trapped populations,” i.e., 
populations that are vulnerable to environmental stress, but lack the resources to move. In Model 
3, we rely on individual self-assessment on whether economic reasons are/were an important 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Examining the results by country suggests that a positive and significant effect can is only found in Nicaragua and 
Peru, while we observe a negative coefficient for the other countries (although only significantly different from 0 in 
Uganda). There is also little evidence that women following their husbands, i.e., dependent migration, can explain 
the positive effect of female migration. Hence, better job opportunities in cities are likely to be the driver behind 
women migration in Nicaragua and Peru. 
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driver of migration. The effect of this variable strongly supports the idea that economic reasons 
are a major force behind individuals’ decision to migrate. Finally, Model 4 stresses that 
individuals with a profession other than our baseline category (agriculture) are less likely to 
migrate. This result provides some support to the assertion that environmental stress is more 
likely to be felt by individuals who are directly dependent on the natural environment for their 
livelihood and, hence, the ones who are more likely to decide to move.  
By incorporating a country-level random intercept, we control for the fact that we study 
internal migration in five different country contexts. However, one could model these diverse 
circumstances more directly by including relevant factors that affect migration patterns within 
states. Two variables seem most relevant from this perspective: the political system and a 
country’s economic development. Both items could influence a country’s capability to react to 
environmental events and, thus, individuals’ decision to stay or migrate. Our findings for this are 
summarized in Table 2, which mirrors Table 1, but we now include a variable on a country’s 
political system, measured by the polity2 item from the Polity IV data (Marshall, Gurr, and 
Jaggers 2013), and GDP per capita in current US Dollars from the World Development 
Indicators. We use data from 2012 to ensure that both variables are measured before the surveys 
were conducted. The results in Table 2 show, however, that none of the country-level variables 
has a statistically significant effect on migration.17 
__________ 
Table 2 
__________ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 We do not explicitly examine interactive relationships between the determinants of migration at different levels, 
since Hunter et al. (2015: 9) describe these relationships as rather “additive.” However, preliminary analyses suggest 
no clear pattern between the political system and individual reactions to the type of environmental event. Since the 
low number of cases at the country level (five) implies that it is difficult to calculate models with multiplicative 
specifications, we divide our sample along the interacted variables. Hence, we run individual regression models by 
countries to better understand how democracy affects the decision to engage in environmental migration. We 
provide the corresponding results in the appendix.  
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The lack of migratory responses to slow-onset events may be driven by a lack of perceptions 
of environmental changes, rather than adaptation strategies. To address this possibility, we also 
examined with more “objective data” whether the impact differs in areas with higher variance in 
weather-related phenomena. For example, households in areas with high weather variance might 
recognize more easily climatic changes (Dell et al. 2014). We considered a variable on 
temperature variance based on “NOAA’s NCEP/NCAR Reanalysis Monthly Means Dataset 
1948-2011” (in degrees Celsius) (Kalnay et al. 1996; see also Landis 2014) in two different 
ways. On one hand, we examined whether this more “objective” variable influences respondents’ 
perceptions of climatic events. On the other hand, we included this control as an additional 
explanatory variable in our models. We find that the more “objective” item does indeed 
influence subjective perceptions: higher variances in temperature do indeed significantly 
increase the likelihood of respondents to perceive gradual events while it decreases the 
likelihood of perceiving sudden events. Moreover, our core results hold when we include the 
temperature-variance variable in the model. 
__________ 
Table 3 
__________ 
Furthermore, Clarke (2005; 2009) shows that the inclusion of control variables can actually 
increase the bias instead of decreasing it. Table 3 then reports the results when dropping the 
control variables. Again, our finding that long-term environmental events are associated with a 
decreased likelihood, while short-term environmental events are associated with an increased 
likelihood of migration, is robust to the inclusion and exclusion of control variables.18 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Moreover, this assessment is further supported by the more formal test introduced in Oster (2015). However, this 
applies more to Gradual Events than to Sudden Events. 
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Conclusion 
Various academics, policymakers, and public institutions suggest that one major consequence of 
climate change is that environmental events force millions of people to migrate permanently or 
temporarily. Migration on such a massive scale could lead to additional adverse outcomes, such 
as social unrest and armed conflict (Bernauer et al. 2012; Laczko and Aghazarm 2009; Reuveny 
2007). However, despite the recent empirical progress, important knowledge gaps still remain. 
We seek to contribute to the existing literature by developing a theoretical argument that 
considers individual perceptions of different types of environmental change and their likely 
effects on individuals’ decision to migrate.  
Empirically, our research improves on existing work in at least four ways. First, we 
introduced new survey data from five different countries, which make our study one of the first 
relying on a quantitative and comparative perspective. Second, our survey allows us to 
distinguish between different types of environmental events. In particular, we considered both 
sudden-onset and long-term environmental problems for which we hypothesized different effects 
on migration. Third, our survey covers people who migrated and those who decided to stay, 
which is crucial for an understanding of whether environmental change does indeed lead to 
migration. Fourth, we not only include individual characteristics, but also explicitly consider 
household-level characteristics and country level factors that should affect people’s migration 
decision. 
The results show that the effect of individual-level perceptions of environmental change 
strongly depends on the nature of the environmental problem: while sudden-onset environmental 
events, such as storms or floods, tend to increase the likelihood of migration, long-term, gradual 
environmental events, such as salinity or droughts, are unlikely to lead to migration but in fact 
decrease its likelihood. This supports our theoretical argument that individuals prefer to stay and 
try to adapt to an environmental problem – instead of opting for the more uncertain and costly 
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option of migration when facing long-term environmental shocks. Our study compliments the 
findings of previous studies, which report that short-term environmental events can lead to 
migration (e.g., Gray and Mueller 2012a; Paul and Routray 2010), while we additionally provide 
new evidence on the nexus between long-term environmental events and migration in the context 
of micro-level studies. 
The main policy implication of our research is that a more differentiated perspective on the 
issue of environmental migration is in need. Where future climatic changes manifested 
themselves in the form of abrupt and extreme environmental events, then large numbers of 
people might be forced to migrate from some areas of the world, particularly from low-altitude 
coastal areas in developing countries. However, if the past provides any insights into what may 
happen in the future, our work suggests that most people prefer to stay and deal with the 
environmental problem by implementing adaptation techniques, especially when faced with 
slow-onset, longer-term environmental events.  
That said, it still might be the case that some individuals stay not because they choose to, but 
rather because they are unable to move due to failed adaptation measures and subsequent 
depletion of resources. Hence, future research should examine whether and to what extent long-
term environmental events lead to effective adaptation and/or entrapment. Either way, improving 
the supply of aid to areas affected by environmental disasters, and the financial and technical 
support for adaptation to environmental problems could potentially be, at least in the short-run, 
the most effective policy options. 
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Table 1. The Determinants of Environmental Migration: Multi-Level Logistic Regression Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Sudden Events 0.40*** 0.10 0.12 0.39*** 
 (0.114) (0.121) (0.136) (0.112) 
Gradual Events -0.62*** -0.36*** -0.67*** -0.69*** 
 (0.107) (0.115) (0.133) (0.106) 
Female 0.21** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.11 
 (0.087) (0.094) (0.106) (0.085) 
Age -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Household Member Migrated 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.33*** 0.41*** 
 (0.088) (0.095) (0.108) (0.088) 
No Education -1.69***    
 (0.211)    
Primary Education -2.07***    
 (0.147)    
Secondary Education -1.58***    
 (0.123)    
Poor Household  -1.03***   
  (0.134)   
Rich Household  0.72***   
  (0.178)   
Economic Reason   3.34***  
   (0.114)  
Civil Servant    -0.56*** 
    (0.187) 
Business Sales    -0.53*** 
    (0.115) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -1.36*** 
    (0.151) 
Elementary Occupation    -0.79*** 
    (0.131) 
Other Sources of Income    -0.53** 
    (0.257) 
Constant 3.52*** 2.46*** 1.14** 3.23*** 
 (0.541) (0.603) (0.454) (0.438) 
     
Country Variance 0.53 0.86 0.00 0.00 
 (0.890) (1.108) (0.000) (0.000) 
District Variance 4.01*** 4.04** 4.18*** 4.16*** 
 (1.547) (1.572) (1.511) (1.473) 
     
Observations 3,614 3,125 3,625 3,477 
Number of Groups (Countries) 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -1,784.51 -1,545.24 -1,310.41 -1,807.08 
Wald χ2 658.62*** 370.51*** 1,006.68*** 554.26*** 
 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random 
effects; standard errors in parentheses.  
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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Table 2. Alternative Models with Multi-Level Logistic Regression Models 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
     
Sudden Events 0.40*** 0.10 0.12 0.39*** 
 (0.114) (0.121) (0.136) (0.112) 
Gradual Events -0.62*** -0.36*** -0.67*** -0.69*** 
 (0.107) (0.115) (0.134) (0.106) 
Female 0.21** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.11 
 (0.087) (0.094) (0.106) (0.085) 
Age -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Household Member Migrated 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.34*** 0.41*** 
 (0.088) (0.095) (0.108) (0.088) 
Democracy -0.05 0.06 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.099) (0.114) (0.085) (0.084) 
GDP per capita -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No Education -1.69***    
 (0.211)    
Primary Education -2.07***    
 (0.147)    
Secondary Education -1.58***    
 (0.123)    
Poor Household  -1.03***   
  (0.134)   
Rich Household  0.73***   
  (0.178)   
Economic Reason   3.34***  
   (0.114)  
Civil Servant    -0.56*** 
    (0.187) 
Business Sales    -0.53*** 
    (0.115) 
Craft and Trade Workers    -1.36*** 
    (0.151) 
Elementary Occupation    -0.79*** 
    (0.131) 
Other Sources of Income    -0.53** 
    (0.257) 
Constant 3.78*** 2.47*** 1.15* 3.39*** 
 (0.731) (0.839) (0.624) (0.605) 
     
Country Variance 0.38 0.79 0.00 0.00 
 (0.794) (1.031) (0.000) (0.000) 
District Variance 4.01*** 3.98*** 4.12*** 4.10*** 
 (1.543) (1.544) (1.491) (1.453) 
     
Observations 3,614 3,125 3,625 3,477 
Number of Groups (Countries) 5 5 5 5 
Log Likelihood -1,784.21 -1,545.08 -1,310.23 -1,806.85 
Wald χ2 658.67*** 370.69*** 1,006.55*** 554.37*** 
 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with country level and district level random 
effects; standard errors in parentheses.  
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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Table 3. Baseline Multi-Level Logistic Regression Model  
 
 Model 9 
  
Sudden Events 0.57 
 (0.757) 
Gradual Events   -0.65*** 
 (0.115) 
Constant 0.04 
 (0.774) 
  
District Variance 3.90 
 (5.702) 
  
Observations 3,674 
Number of Groups (Countries) 5 
Log Likelihood -2,248.74 
Wald χ2 62.36*** 
 
Table entries are coefficients from multilevel logistic regression models with district level random effects; standard 
errors in parentheses.  
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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Figure 1. The Probability of Migration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph shows predicted probabilities for Migration=1; horizontal bars pertain to 90% confidence intervals; left panel 
captures probabilities for Sudden Event=1, while right panel pertains to probabilities for Gradual Event=1; all other 
variables held constant at their means; calculations are based on Table 2 and include both fixed and random effects. 
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Figure 2. First Differences  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph shows changes in the probability of Migration=1 when changing either Sudden Events (green bars) or 
Gradual Events (red bars) from 0 to 1, while holding all other variables at their observed values; calculations are 
based on Table 2 and include both fixed and random effects. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Overview of Surveys 
 Vietnam Uganda Cambodia Nicaragua Peru 
Non Migrants: 
Subnational 
Locations and 
Type of 
Environmental 
Problems 
 
 
 
 
 
Migrants: 
Regional and 
Capital Cities 
Ba Tri  
(salinity) 
Chau Phu 
(flood) 
Giao Thuy 
(cyclone) 
Ninh Hai 
(drought) 
 
 
 
Hanoi 
Ho Chi Minh 
city 
Kotido and 
Moroto 
(drought, heavy 
rain/flood) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kampala 
Kotido 
Mbale 
Cheung Prey 
Kang Meas 
Koh Sotin 
Krouch Chhma 
(storm/flood/ 
Khsach kandal 
Koaoh Thum 
Lvea Aem 
S'ang 
(flood/drought) 
 
Phnom Penh 
Kampong 
Cham 
 
Managua, 
Chinandega, 
and Leon 
(drought) 
R.A.A.N and 
R.A.A.S 
(storms) 
 
 
 
 
Managua, Leon 
Chinandega 
Cusco (flood, 
cold weather) 
Puno (drought) 
Piura 
(drought/flood) 
Arequipa 
(flood) 
Lima (drought) 
 
 
 
Cusco, 
Puno, 
Piura, 
Arequipa, and 
Lima 
Political 
System 
Autocracy 
Polity IV: -7 
Anocracy 
Polity IV: -1 
Anocracy 
Polity IV: 2 
Democracy 
Polity IV: 9 
Democracy 
Polity IV: 9 
Income – GDP 
per capita 2012 1,755 USD  653 USD 946 USD 6,424 USD 1,777 USD 
Number of 
Participants 
(50% Migrants) 
1,200 672 600 600 617 
Survey Period Sept-Oct 2013 Sept-Oct 2013 Jan-Feb 2014 Mar-Apr 2014 Jul-Aug 2014 
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Tables A2. Individual Country Data Overviews 
Vietnam 
Variable Yes No N 
Migrants 600 600 1200 
Sudden events 982 218 1200 
Gradual events 352 848 1200 
Female 685 515 1200 
Family member has migrated 459 739 1198 
No education 21 1177 1198 
Primary education 232 966 1198 
Secondary education 642 556 1198 
Poor household 300 479 779 
Rich household 153 626 779 
Economic reason to migrate 565 635 1200 
Civil servant 63 1137 1200 
Business sales 237 963 1200 
Craft and trade workers 125 1049 1200 
Elementary occupations 151 1049 1200 
Other sources of income 6 1194 1200 
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Uganda 
Variable Yes No N 
Migrants 353 319 672 
Sudden events 194 478 672 
Gradual events 632 40 672 
Female 427 243 670 
Family member has migrated 247 406 653 
No education 522 140 672 
Primary education 109 553 662 
Secondary education 15 647 662 
Poor household 533 134 667 
Rich household 23 644 667 
Economic reason to migrate 342 330 672 
Civil servant 6 611 617 
Business sales 145 472 617 
Craft and trade workers 16 601 617 
Elementary occupations 72 545 617 
Other sources of income 55 617 672 
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Cambodia 
Variable Yes No N 
Migrants 300 300 600 
Sudden events 567 33 600 
Gradual events 315 285 600 
Female 367 233 600 
Family member has migrated 339 260 599 
No education 61 539 600 
Primary education 164 436 600 
Secondary education 147 453 600 
Poor household 157 368 525 
Rich household 86 439 525 
Economic reason to migrate 288 312 600 
Civil servant 22 484 506 
Business sales 89 417 506 
Craft and trade workers 21 485 506 
Elementary occupations 17 489 506 
Other sources of income 105 495 600 
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Nicaragua 
Variable Yes No N 
Migrants 300 300 600 
Sudden events 351 240 591 
Gradual events 176 415 591 
Female 350 250 600 
Family member has migrated 205 394 599 
No education 55 544 599 
Primary education 181 418 599 
Secondary education 258 341 599 
Poor household 536 64 600 
Rich household 4 596 600 
Economic reason to migrate 228 372 600 
Civil servant 63 537 600 
Business sales 77 523 600 
Craft and trade workers 131 469 600 
Elementary occupations 126 474 600 
Other sources of income 53 547 600 
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Peru 
Variable Yes No N 
Migrants 301 316 617 
Sudden events 497 114 611 
Gradual events 113 498 611 
Female 361 256 617 
Family member has migrated 199 410 609 
No education 23 594 617 
Primary education 165 452 617 
Secondary education 281 336 617 
Poor household 535 82 617 
Rich household 4 613 617 
Economic reason to migrate 221 396 617 
Civil servant 39 577 616 
Business sales 121 495 616 
Craft and trade workers 64 552 616 
Elementary occupations 115 501 616 
Other sources of income 33 584 617 
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Table A3: Individual country regressions 
Baseline models by country 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Cambodia Vietnam Uganda Peru Nicaragua 
      
Sudden Events -2.28*** 1.67*** -0.44* -0.92*** 0.56*** 
 (0.83) (0.52) (0.26) (0.29) (0.19) 
Gradual Events -0.26 -0.63* -1.19** -1.13*** -0.64*** 
 (0.30) (0.37) (0.48) (0.31) (0.21) 
Female -0.02 -0.30 -0.49** 0.78*** 0.90*** 
 (0.31) (0.32) (0.25) (0.20) (0.19) 
Age -0.21*** -0.16*** 0.01 -0.07*** -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
HH Member 0.50* 0.96*** -0.77*** 0.73*** 0.18 
migrated (0.30) (0.33) (0.25) (0.22) (0.20) 
 
Economic Reason 
 
3.09*** 
 
7.12*** 
 
3.81*** 
 
1.55*** 
 
1.68*** 
 (0.31) (0.51) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) 
Constant 6.61*** 1.05 -0.09 2.13*** -1.14*** 
 (1.09) (0.73) (0.69) (0.42) (0.36) 
Log lik. -152.10 -146.76 -240.98 -321.61 -349.11 
Observations 599 1198 635 603 590 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Questionnaire 
Interview ID _____ --______--______     
Date: ____/____/_____ 
Interviewer ID _____________________ 
 
Location: [to be filled out prior to interview]
Coordinates: 
Commune/Village/Town: 
District: 
Province: 
 
Current Weather [observed]: 
Number of households (HH) in 
village/town: 
 
 
Respondent: [based on observation] 
Household Status [scale determined before start of interview]   
1. Very poor  
 2. Poor 
 3. Average 
 4. Above average 
 5. Wealthy 
99. N/A [Circle if interview not conducted in respondent home] 
 
Sex of Respondent 
1. Female    2. Male 
 
Interview Schedule  
How long have you lived in this location?  
1. Since birth  
2. ____________ [years] 
99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer  
 
Where did you come from? 
Commune/Village: ___________________ District_________________ Province___________ 
 
Were you born there?  
 1. Yes  
 2. No 
 99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer 
 
How long were you in that previous location for? 
  _______________ years  
 99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer  
What is the highest level of formal education you have attended? 
[Ask for specific number of years completed] 
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 1. No formal education 
 2. Primary school _________ Years completed  
 3. Secondary_________ Years completed 
 4. Technical ________________Years completed 
 4. Post-Secondary ___________ Years completed 
 5. Other ________________ 
 99. Don’t know/Refused to Answer 
 
 
Could you tell us your age? ___________  
[If does not know or refuses to respond, interviewer to guess] 
 
 
I will read you a list of sources of income. Could you tell us which are your (household) main 
source(s) of income? (Non-migrant) - I will read you a list of sources of income. Could you tell us 
which were your (household) main source(s) of income in your former location? (Migrant) 
(Circle all mentioned. If more than one was mentioned, ask to rank them in order of importance 
(from 1-5, 1 the most important) (Insert number in spaces provided in question BELOW)  
 
1. __________________ Agriculture/Farm /animal /fishing income 
2.__________________ Proceeds as shop/business owner 
3.__________________Proceeds markets sales (non-farm) 
4.__________________Civil servant salary 
5.__________________Salary from industry (firm, factory, corporation) 
6.__________________Salary from labor (handicrafts, construction) 
7.__________________Day Labor-Temporary 
8.__________________Artisanal Mining  
9.__________________Remittances 
10._________________ Professional 
11.__________________Other 
99._________________Don’t Know /Refused to Answer 
 
 
From your perspective, can you describe the main weather event(s) that have happened here during 
the last 5 years? (Non-migrant) – From your perspective, can you describe the main weather 
event(s) that occurred during the past five years before you left your previous residence? (Migrant) 
[If respondent is unable to answer freely, read the list. For each reported event follow up with 
questions in the following table] . [Circle all that apply] Show Card 
1. Heavy Rains/Floods [please circle] 
2. Salinity 
3. Snow/Hail [please circle] 
4. Drought/Desertification [please circle] 
5. Storm/Cyclone/Typhoon [please circle] 
6. Landslide/Mudslide/Avalanche [please circle] 
7. Other______________________________ 
8. None 
99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer  
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Have you ever thought about migrating? If yes, then ask: What was/were the reason(s)? (Non-
migrant) - I would like to ask you all the reason(s) why you decided to move from your former 
location. (Migrant) 
[Allow respondents to answer without reading list and circle all responses in “Unprompted 
Column”. Then follow up by reading list/Show Card. Additional responses should be circled in 
“Prompted Column”]  
Social reasons: for example, Marriage; There are family/relatives in the new location; I was facing 
discrimination; There was insecurity (physical &/or sexual); To seek health care (inadequate 
health care in area); To seek schooling (e.g. no school in area); Other 
Economic reasons: for example, Not enough income from livelihood sources; Unreliable harvest;  
No land available for farming/agriculture; Crop failure; Unemployment in that location; Job 
opportunity in new place; Higher income in new place; Other 
Environmental reasons: for example, Water shortage/Drought [1 event]; Repeated droughts /Long 
Term salinity; Too much water; Short term events such as flood, storm, landslide, cyclone: 
Single event or Repeated Event; Other 
Political reasons: for example, There was conflict; To seek political freedom; Government 
provided incentives for me to go; Government forced me to move; Other 
 
 Of all the reasons you mentioned, could you please rank the top three most important factors? 
[Write number of code from above reason in first, second and third place below, with number 1 as 
the most important] 
1st _______________ 
2nd _______________ 
3rd________________ 
99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer
Circle events 
reported in 
previous 
question  
1. Heavy 
Rain/Flood 
2. Salinity 3. Snow/Hail 4. Drought/ 
Desertificatio
n 
5. Cyclone/ 
Typhoon/ 
Storm 
6. Landslide/ 
Mudslide/ 
Avalanche/ 
7. Other 
 [For short 
term events]  
When did this 
event last 
occur?  
[Or for 
progressive 
environmenta
l events] 
 When did 
this event 
begin? 
 
 
Month 
 
 
Year 
 
99. DK/RA 
 
 
Month 
 
 
Year 
 
99. DK/RA 
 
 
 
Month 
 
 
Year 
 
99. DK/RA 
 
 
Month 
 
 
Year 
 
99. DK/RA 
 
 
 
Month 
 
 
Year 
 
99. DK/RA 
 
 
 
Month 
 
 
Year 
 
99. DK/RA 
 
 
 
Month 
 
 
Year 
 
99. DK/RA 
 
How long did 
this event 
last? 
1. days 
2. weeks 
3. months 
4. years 
99. DK/RA 
1. days 
2. weeks 
3. months 
4. years 
99. DK/RA 
1. days 
2. weeks 
3. months 
4. years 
99. DK/RA 
1. days 
2. weeks 
3. months 
4. years 
99. DK/RA 
1. days 
2. weeks 
3. months 
4. years 
99. DK/RA 
1. days 
2. weeks 
3. months 
4. years 
99. DK/RA 
1. days 
2. weeks 
3. months 
4. years 
99. DK/RA 
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Up until now, have members of your household left temporarily or permanently for other places 
or even abroad? (Non-migrant) -Up until now, have other members of your household in your 
previous location left temporarily or permanently for other places, or even abroad? 
[Excluding respondent](Migrant) 
 1. Yes  
 2. No 
     99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer 
 
 
Do you know of anyone who left after having experienced the same event(s) 
(drought/desertification/flood/cyclone/etc)? [Not from the same HH] (Non-migrant) - Do you 
know anyone else who left from your previous location around the same time you did? [Other 
than you] (Migrant) 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 99. Don’t Know/Refused to Answer  
 
Where did they go? [List all locations mentioned] 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Would you be willing to provide us with the name and contact information for these people so 
that we may ask a similar set of questions? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
